Ideas from 'Logical Properties' by Colin McGinn [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Logical Properties' by McGinn,Colin [OUP 2003,0-19-926263-2]].

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

6052	Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress

6064	Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth

6088	Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

6084	'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall

6085	The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique

6083	The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth

6086	Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts

6087	Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic

6051	In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements

6055	Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation

6059	Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

6067	Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'

6042	The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification

6069	'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification

6068	We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence

6070	Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

6062	Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence

6065	We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

6082	If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

6075	Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

6058	Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity

6053	Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity

6043	Type-identity is close similarity in qualities

6045	It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'

6044	Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties

6046	Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity

6054	Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical

6066	Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

6047	All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

6050	Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity

6049	Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'

6048	Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality

6080	Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds

6079	If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

6081	Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism

6071	Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics

6077	Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics

6074	Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

6072	If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence

6073	I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined